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Abstract
The safety of navigation remains an issue in the sense that navigation through the 
South China Sea is essential for world seaborne trade and communications, and the 
lingering territorial and maritime disputes would constitute a threat to the safety of 
navigation there. In recent years, the term ‘freedom of navigation’ has become a piv-
otal expression in the rivalry between China and the United States in the South China 
Sea. This paper starts with addressing the international legal framework concerning 
navigation, followed by state practice in the South China Sea, including domestic leg-
islation and safety measures. It then discusses the issue of military activities in the 
exclusive economic zone and their implications for the freedom of navigation. The 
paper identifies several issues connected to navigation, such as the U-shaped line, law 
enforcement patrols, and the recent South China Sea Arbitration. A brief conclusion 
is provided at the end.
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 Introduction
The South China Sea, categorised as a semi-enclosed sea under the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC or Convention),1 is one of 
1   United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, in force 
16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 396 (hereinafter “LOSC”).
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the most important seas in the world, not only in that it contains rich marine 
resources and distinctive biodiversity, but also because it forms a critical sea 
route for global trade and communications. There are important sea lanes of 
communications (SLOCs) that are vital for the adjacent countries in East Asia 
and also for the rest of the world. More than half of the world’s merchant fleet 
capacity sails through the straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok and the South 
China Sea.2 More than 10,000 vessels of greater than 10,000 dwt move south-
ward through the South China Sea annually, with well over 8,000 proceeding in 
the opposite direction.3 In addition, with the rise of China and the fast growth 
of economies in East Asia, the recent trend to greater intra-Asian trade (rela-
tive to trade with Europe and North America) results in more shipping in the 
littoral waters of Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.4
The South China Sea is also known as a flashpoint of territorial and mari-
time disputes between/among multiple claimants. The complicated political 
landscape of the South China Sea contains the potential for conflicts with vari-
ous national interests. As for the four groups of islands, because of their dif-
ferent geographical locations, their political statuses differ from one another. 
The Pratas Islands are under the full control of the Taiwanese authorities. No 
competing claims exist there under the current “one China” policy across the 
Taiwan Strait.5 For the Macclesfield Bank Group, the only claimant is China 
(including mainland China and Taiwan).6 Nevertheless, as Scarborough Reef is 
considered part of the Macclesfield Group, recent developments indicate that 
the Philippines has also lodged its territorial claim over the Reef, and over the 
Macclesfield Group. The Paracel Islands are under the control of China, though 
contested by the Vietnamese. The dispute over the Spratly Islands is the most 
complicated, because it has been lingering for a long time and involves as many 
2   See SB Weeks, ‘Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) security and access’ in M Stankiewicz 
(ed), Maritime Shipping in Northeast Asia: Law of the Sea, Sea Lanes, and Security (Institute on 
Global Conflict and Co-operation, University of California, San Diego, 1998) 49–61, at p. 55.
3   H Olson, ‘Marine traffic in the South China Sea’ (1996) 12 Ocean Yearbook 137–153, at p. 137.
4   See SJ Meyrick, ‘Development in Asian maritime trade’, in Stankiewicz (n 2), at p. 21.
5   This policy has been held by Beijing and Taipei based on the so-called “92 Consensus” which 
supports one China but with different interpretations. For Beijing, “one China” is the People’s 
Republic of China; for Taipei, it refers to the Republic of China on Taiwan. For details, 
see A Teon, ‘The 1992 Consensus and China-Taiwan Relations’, 31 August 2016, available at 
https://china-journal.org/2016/08/31/the-1992-consensus-and-china-taiwan-relations/.
6   A main reason that there is no other claimant for the Macclesfield Bank is that this Bank 
is permanently sub-merged under the water. Otherwise, Vietnam or the Philippines might 
have claimed it as well. However, the recent Vietnamese extended continental shelf claims 
intruded into the area of Zhongsha Qundao claimed by the Chinese.
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as five states and six parties, i.e., China, Chinese Taipei, Malaysia, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Brunei. It is predicted that if the issue of the Spratly Islands is 
not handled well, it could pose a danger or threat to peace and security in the 
East Asian region and even beyond.
Having said that, we have come to know that there are three layers of dis-
putes in the South China Sea. The first and most fundamental are the over-
lapping claims of sovereignty to the geographic features between/among 
littoral states; the second are the overlapping claims to the maritime zones 
generated either from the islands or from the surrounding coasts of the littoral 
states which are basically related to sovereign rights and jurisdiction as stipu-
lated under the LOSC; and the third are the disputes in relation to the use of 
the oceans, including conflicting uses of marine resources and development 
between/among littoral states, the use of sea lanes and the conduct of military 
activities in the name of the freedom of navigation between littoral states and 
user states. These are entangled disputes, thus making the South China Sea the 
most complicated of all territorial and maritime disputes in the world.
The safety of navigation still remains an issue in the sense that navigation 
through the South China Sea is essential for world seaborne trade and com-
munications, and also the lingering territorial and maritime disputes would 
constitute a threat to the safety of navigation there. In recent years, the term 
‘freedom of navigation’ has become a pivotal expression in the rivalry between 
China and the United States in the South China Sea. This paper starts with 
addressing the international legal framework concerning navigation, followed 
by state practice in the South China Sea, including domestic legislation and 
safety measures. It then discusses the issue of military activities in the exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ) and their implications for the freedom of naviga-
tion. The paper also identifies several issues connected to navigation, such as 
the U-shaped line, law enforcement patrols, and the recent South China Sea 
Arbitration. A brief conclusion is provided at the end.
 Navigation in the International Context
Freedom of navigation has been accepted as a principle of international law 
for centuries. However, it was first incorporated into conventional interna-
tional law as late as 1958 when the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the 
Sea were adopted.7 At present, the navigational rights of vessels are mainly 
7   Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Geneva, 29 April 1958, in force 
10 September 1964) 516 UNTS 205; Convention on the Continental Shelf (Geneva, 29 April 
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governed by the LOSC, though there are relevant treaties in this respect ad-
opted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
The LOSC has made the legal arrangements for navigational rights of for-
eign vessels in accordance with different sea zones established under the 
Convention. The sea zones include internal waters, the territorial sea (TS), 
straits used for international navigation, archipelagic waters, the EEZ, the con-
tinental shelf (CS), the high seas, and the international seabed (the Area). The 
sea zones of internal waters, the territorial sea, and the EEZ are particularly 
related to navigational rights of foreign vessels within the national jurisdiction 
of a coastal state.
The term ‘internal waters’ or ‘inland waters’ refers to “waters on the land-
ward side of the baseline of the territorial sea”.8 It can cover “a group of cognate 
but separable legal areas, namely: bays, gulfs, estuaries, and creeks; ports and 
roadsteads; and water inside straight baselines linking the coast with offshore 
features”.9 Because internal waters are part of the territory of a coastal state, no 
freedom of navigation is granted there and any navigational rights are subject 
to the regulations of the coastal state.
The territorial sea is also part of the territory of the coastal state, which has 
full sovereignty over it. However, due to the expeditiousness of navigation, the 
right of innocent passage is reserved for foreign vessels under the guarantee of 
international law. The meaning of innocent passage is explained in the LOSC 
as follows:
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in 
conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international 
law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the 
peace, good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea 
it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any 
1958, in force 10 June 1964) 499 UNTS 311; Convention on the High Seas (Geneva, 29 April 
1958, in force 30 September 1962) 450 UNTS 11; and Convention on Fishing and Conservation 
of the Living Resources of the High Seas (Geneva, 29 April 1958, in force 20 March 1966) 559 
UNTS 285.
8   LOSC (n 1), at Art. 8.
9   DP O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Volume I (edited by IA Shearer) (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1982) 338.
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other manner in violation of the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the 
defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security 
of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person 
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this 
Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication 
or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.10
Passage here means
navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of: (a) traversing 
that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port 
facility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal 
waters or a call at such roadstead or port facility.11
Furthermore, passage
shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes stopping 
and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary 
navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for 
the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger 
or distress.12
10   LOSC (n 1), at Art. 19.
11   LOSC (n 1), at Art. 18.
12   Ibid.
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Coastal states have the duty not to hamper the innocent passage of foreign 
ships through the territorial sea except in accordance with LOSC. In particular, 
the coastal states
shall not: ‘(a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the 
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage; or 
(b) discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State or against 
ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State’.13
In addition, the “coastal state shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to 
navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial sea”.14
On the other hand, the coastal state may adopt laws and regulations on, 
inter alia, the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic and 
the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or instal-
lations, in conformity with the provisions of the Convention and other rules 
of international law, relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea. 
Such laws and regulations do not apply to the design, construction, manning 
or equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accept-
ed international rules or standards. “Foreign ships exercising the right of in-
nocent passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all such laws and 
regulations and all generally accepted international regulations relating to the 
prevention of collisions at sea”.15 Furthermore, the coastal state may take “nec-
essary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent”.16 In 
the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility outside 
internal waters, the coastal state also has “the right to take the necessary steps 
to prevent any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to 
internal waters or such a call is subject”.17 The coastal state
may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, sus-
pend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent pas-
sage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of 
its security, including weapons exercises. Such suspension takes effect 
only after having been duly published.18
13   Ibid., at Art. 24. 
14   Ibid.
15   Ibid., at Art. 21.
16   Ibid., at Art. 25(1).
17   Ibid., at Art. 25(2).
18   Ibid., at Art. 25(3).
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The coastal state may, where necessary, having regard to the safety of naviga-
tion, “require foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through 
its territorial sea to use such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as it may 
designate or prescribe for the regulation of the passage of ships”.19 In particu-
lar, “tankers, nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inher-
ently dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required to confine 
their passage to such sea lanes”.20 In the designation of sea lanes and the pre-
scription of traffic separation schemes, the coastal state
shall take into account: (a) the recommendations of the competent in-
ternational organization; (b) any channels customarily used for interna-
tional navigation; (c) the special characteristics of particular ships and 
channels; and (d) the density of traffic.21
The coastal state “shall clearly indicate such sea lanes and traffic separation 
schemes on charts to which due publicity should be given”.22
Foreign nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inher-
ently dangerous or noxious substances shall, when exercising the right 
of innocent passage through the territorial sea, carry documents and ob-
serve special precautionary measures established for such ships by inter-
national agreements.23
Despite the above stipulations in the LOSC, state practice is still divergent in 
regard to the right of innocent passage for foreign warships, although there is a 
uniform practice regarding the same right for foreign merchant vessels. Some 
countries, including China, impose the requirement of prior authorization on 
the innocent passage of foreign warships.24
As to navigation in the EEZ, the LOSC provides a legal regime similar to that 
in the high seas, i.e., freedom of navigation for foreign vessels including foreign 
warships.25 However, as it is an area within national jurisdiction, the coastal 
19   Ibid., at Art. 22(1).
20   Ibid., at Art. 22(2).
21   Ibid., at Art. 22(3).
22   Ibid., at Art. 22(4).
23   Ibid., at Art. 23.
24   For details, see K Zou, ‘Innocent passage for warships: The Chinese doctrine and practice’ 
(1998) 29(3) Ocean Development and International Law 195–223.
25   LOSC (n 1), at Art. 58.
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state may have the right to lay down necessary laws and regulations relating to 
navigational safety and marine environmental protection. In this respect, the 
coastal state may well be aware that its laws and regulations may not hamper 
the smooth navigation of foreign vessels in and through its EEZ. On the other 
hand, foreign vessels are obliged to have due regard to the rights and duties of 
the coastal state and should comply with the laws and regulations adopted by 
the coastal state in accordance with the LOSC and other applicable rules of 
international law.26
Navigation in straits used for international navigation was hotly debated 
during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 
III). Finally, the LOSC adopted ‘transit passage’ for foreign vessels passing 
through straits used for international navigation. According to the definition 
given in the LOSC, these straits are located within the territorial seas of the 
coastal states concerned but are critical navigable channels for international 
maritime transportation, such as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The 
other sea area within national jurisdiction where foreign vessels enjoy naviga-
tional rights are the archipelagic waters.
As for the high seas, all states enjoy freedom of navigation. Judging from the 
legal arrangements under the LOSC, the legal situation for navigational rights 
of foreign vessels within national jurisdiction is just as Sohn once depicted: 
“The rule of thumb is that the closer a ship comes to land, the stronger is the 
control of the coastal state”.27
 Chinese Domestic Regulations
China has enacted a series of laws and regulations governing the navigation 
of foreign vessels in China’s different waters in accordance with general inter-
national law, particularly the LOSC. The most important ones include, inter 
alia, the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Law on the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, the Law on Maritime 
Traffic Safety,28 the Regulations Governing  Supervision and Control of Foreign 
26   Ibid., at Art. 58(3).
27   LB Sohn, ‘International navigation: Interests related to national security’ in JM Van Dyke, 
LM Alexander and JR Morgan (eds), International Navigation: Rocks and Shoals Ahead? 
(The Law of the Sea Institute, Honolulu, 1988) 307–323, at p. 307.
28   The text is available in Office of Laws and Regulations, Department of Ocean Management 
and Monitoring, State Oceanic Administration (ed), Collection of the Sea Laws and 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China (Ocean Press, Beijing, 1991) 248.
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Vessels, the Regulations Governing Non-Military Foreign Vessels Passing 
Through the Chiungchow Strait. In order to exercise navigational rights with-
in China’s jurisdictional waters, foreign vessels have to comply with a set of 
Chinese laws and regulations concerning navigation and management of for-
eign vessels. Several general laws and regulations including the above in China 
are applicable to foreign ships in all jurisdictional waters of the PRC.29
Under international law, the right of innocent passage is a well-established 
rule and constitutes a part of the territorial sea regime. On 4 September 1958, 
China promulgated the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, which is gen-
erally regarded as the first law to regulate the territorial sea of China. On in-
nocent passage, the Declaration stated that “[n]o foreign vessels for military 
use and no foreign aircraft may enter China’s territorial sea and the air space 
above it without the permission of the Government of the People’s Republic 
of China. While navigating in the Chinese territorial sea, every foreign vessel 
must observe the relevant laws and regulations laid down by the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China”.30 The Law on Maritime Traffic Safety, which 
came into effect on 1 January 1984, provides in Article 11 that “[n]o military ves-
sels of foreign nationality may enter the territorial sea of the People’s Republic 
of China without being authorised by the Government thereof”.31 The 1992 
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (the Territorial Sea Law) 
contains several important provisions relating to innocent passage.32
According to the Territorial Sea Law, foreign ships used for non-military 
purposes enjoy the right of innocent passage through China’s territorial sea 
in accordance with the law. However, foreign ships used for military purposes 
are subject to permission of the Chinese Government before entering the ter-
ritorial sea (Art. 6). Foreign submarines and other underwater vehicles, when 
passing through the territorial sea, should navigate on the surface and show 
their flag (Art. 7). Foreign ships passing through China’s territorial sea must 
comply with the laws and regulations of China and shall not be prejudicial to 
the peace, security and good order of China. Foreign nuclear-powered ships 
and ships carrying nuclear, noxious or other dangerous substances, when pass-
ing through the territorial sea, must carry relevant documents and take spe-
cial precautionary measures. The Chinese Government has the right to take all 
29   For details, see K Zou, ‘Navigation of foreign vessels within China’s jurisdictional waters’ 
(2002) 29(4) Maritime Policy and Management 351–374.
30   Section 3 of the Declaration, in Office of Laws and Regulations (n 28), at p. 4.
31   Ibid., at pp. 237–238.
32   The English version is reprinted in K Zou, China’s Marine Legal System and the Law of the 
Sea (Nijhoff, Leiden, 2005) 338–341.
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necessary measures to prevent and stop non-innocent passage through its ter-
ritorial sea. Cases of foreign ships violating the laws and regulations of China 
will be handled by the relevant Chinese organs in accordance with the law 
(Art. 8). The Chinese Government may, for maintaining the safety of navigation 
or for other special needs, request foreign ships passing through its territorial 
sea to use the designated sea lanes or to navigate according to the prescribed 
traffic separation schemes. The specific regulations to this effect will be pro-
mulgated by the Chinese Government or its competent authorities concerned 
(Art. 9). In the case of violation of the Chinese laws or regulations by a foreign 
ship used for military purposes or a foreign government ship used for non-
commercial purposes when passing through the territorial sea of China, the 
Chinese competent authorities have the right to order it to leave the territorial 
sea immediately and the flag state should bear international responsibility for 
any loss or damage caused by the ship (Art. 10).
In 1996 when ratifying the LOSC, China re-emphasised its position on in-
nocent passage for foreign warships by stating that “the provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning innocent pas-
sage through the territorial sea shall not prejudice the right of a coastal State 
to request, in accordance with its laws and regulations, a foreign State to ob-
tain advance approval from or give prior notification to the coastal State for 
the passage of its warships through the territorial sea of the coastal State”.33 
However, China’s regulations on innocent passage for foreign warships may 
not be consistent with the relevant provisions of the LOSC. As a party to the 
LOSC, China is obliged to abide by the Convention. It may be wise to improve 
the situation by amending China’s domestic law and bringing it fully in line 
with the Convention.
 Navigation in the EEZ
Because coastal states have the right to enact laws and regulations governing 
their EEZ and resources, those laws and regulations may have an impact on 
the navigation of foreign vessels. According to China’s Law on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, foreign vessels, including warships, 
can enjoy the freedom of navigation in China’s EEZ provided they comply 
with the relevant Chinese laws and regulations as well as international law.34 
Although there is no substantive difference, navigation under the EEZ regime 
33   See ‘Decision to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress [15 May 1996]’ (16 May 1996) 
People’s Daily (Overseas Edition) (in Chinese).
34   Chinese EEZ Law, at Art. 11. The English version is available in Zou (n 32), at pp. 342–345.
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may not be as free as under the high seas regime simply because of the sover-
eign rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state over its EEZ. For example, the 
Chinese EEZ Law provides that China has the right to take necessary measures 
against violations of Chinese laws and regulations, to investigate according to 
the law those who are liable, and may ex ercise the right of hot pursuit.35
As depicted by some scholars, there are two trends in governing naviga-
tion in the EEZ: ‘thickening jurisdiction’ and ‘creeping jurisdiction’.36 The term 
‘thickening jurisdiction’ refers to “the process of either tightening regulations 
over activities within the EEZ in areas where the coastal State legitimately ex-
ercises jurisdiction, or extending regulations to activities that are usually re-
garded as not within the jurisdiction of the coastal State”.37 Though China’s 
Law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf does not mention how to govern 
foreign military activities in its EEZ, the 2001 Sino-American air collision inci-
dent over China’s EEZ in the South China Sea manifested China’s intention to 
oversee and control military activities of foreign states within its EEZ.38
 Are Military Activities Navigational Rights?
According to one scholar, military use of the oceans consists of two categories: 
movement rights and operational rights. The former embraces the notion of 
mobility and includes such legal rights as transit passage through straits used 
for international navigation, innocent passage in territorial seas and archipe-
lagic waters, and high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, and the lat-
ter includes such activities as task force manoeuvering, anchoring, intelligence 
35   Ibid., at Art. 12. It is based on LOSC (n 1), at Art. 111(2).
36   See WS Ball, ‘The old grey mare, national enclosure of the oceans’ (1996) 27(1–2) Ocean 
Development and International Law 97–124, at p. 103. He states that “coastal states are 
more stringently regulating a wider range of activities with their prescribed zones [‘thick-
ening jurisdiction’], while at the same time they are expanding the reach of their regula-
tions beyond 200 miles [‘creeping jurisdiction’]”.
37   WSG Bateman, DR Rothwell and D VanderZwaag, ‘Navigational rights and freedoms in 
the new millennium: Dealing with 20th century controversies and 21st century challeng-
es’ in DR Rothwell and WSG Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and Freedoms and the 
New Law of the Sea (Nijhoff, The Hague, 2000) 314–335, at p. 324.
38   On 1 April 2001, a US spy plane collided with a Chinese jet fighter in an area 104 kilometres 
from the baseline of Chinese territorial waters. China condemned the United States for 
violating the rule reflected in the LOSC (n 1) which stipulates that any flight in airspace 
above another state’s EEZ should respect the rights of the country concerned. See ‘FM 
spokesman gives full account of air collision’ (4 April 2001) China Daily.
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collection and surveillance, military exercises, ordnance testing and firing, and 
hydrographic and military surveys.39
There is a controversy over whether the conduct of military activities in 
the EEZ of another country is legitimate. Some states may invoke Article 58(1) 
LOSC to justify their military activities in other countries’ EEZs. The provision 
reads:
[i]n the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-
locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the 
freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally law-
ful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated 
with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, 
and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
Freedoms on the high seas provided in Article 87 are thus applicable to the EEZ 
as long as they are not contrary to other provisions of the LOSC. According to 
maritime powers such as the United States, the term freedoms “associated with 
the operation of ships, aircraft” implies the legality of naval manoeuvres in a 
foreign EEZ.40 One view even considers military exercises, aerial reconnais-
sance and all other activities of military aircraft as freedom of high seas if due 
regard is paid to the rights and interests of third states.41 As advocated, because 
the LOSC mainly provides the rights of navigation and overflight, but keeps 
silent on the rights of military activities, maritime superpowers must defend 
and enforce such rights for their security interests.
The LOSC does not mention military use; hence it becomes a grey area lead-
ing to different interpretations. It is argued that without an express mention 
in the Convention, military use is hardly regarded as one of such lawful uses. 
39   CE Pirtle, ‘Military uses of ocean space and the law of the sea in the new millennium’ 
(2000) 31(1–2) Ocean Development and International Law 7–45, at p. 8.
40   See BA Boczek, ‘Peacetime military activities in the exclusive economic zone of third 
countries’ (1988) 19(6) Ocean Development and International Law 445–468, at p. 450.
41   K Hailbronner, ‘Freedom of the air and the Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (1983) 77(3) 
American Journal of International Law 490–520, at p. 503. A US operational commander 
opined that the EEZ regime “does not permit the coastal state to limit traditional non-
resources related high seas activities in this EEZ, such as task force manoeuvring, flight 
operations, military exercises, telecommunications and space activities, intelligence 
and surveillance activities, marine data collection, and weapons’ testing and firing”. 
WF Doran, ‘An operational commander’s perspective on the 1982 LOS Convention’ (1995) 
10(3) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 335–348, at p. 341.
Navigation in the South China Sea: Why Still an Issue?  255
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 32 (2017) 243–267
However, such an argument may not be convincing. According to a fundamen-
tal legal principle, nothing is illegal if there is no law to make it so. Following 
this principle, military use is not prohibited because there is no such prohibi-
tion in the LOSC. Second, the LOSC in its preamble affirms that matters which 
are not regulated under it continue to be governed by general international 
law. This is considered to include customary international law. Looking back at 
history, military activities were consistently allowed under customary interna-
tional law, though in the implied form. In that sense, it is argued that military 
activities could be a historically lawful use of the high seas.42 Third, it is admit-
ted that there is a difficulty in inferring from the text and legislative history of 
Article 58 LOSC that the creation of the EEZ has limited foreign military opera-
tions other than pure navigation and communication.43
The legality of military activities under international law does not mean 
that they can be conducted in the EEZ without any regulation. It should be 
borne in mind that the circumstances now are fundamentally different from 
those in the past. There was and still is no controversy regarding military ac-
tivities conducted in the high seas which was and is open to all. The EEZ is 
different from the high seas in that it is an area under national jurisdiction. 
Although military activities are permitted there, the factor of national jurisdic-
tion must be taken into account. Even if military use is an internationally law-
ful use, it can be argued that according to the LOSC it is limited to navigation 
and overflight, and other rights as provided in Article 87 of the Convention. 
This can be gleaned from some domestic EEZ legislations, such as Suriname’s, 
which provides that “all nations, with the observance of the international law, 
enjoy: […] 4. Freedom to exercise internationally recognized rights in connec-
tion with navigation and communication”.44
In practice, coastal states, including Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, India, 
Pakistan, and Uruguay, explicitly restrict unapproved military exercises or ac-
tivities in or over their EEZs conducted by other countries. According to the 
42   See D Guilfoyle, ‘Maritime security’ in J Barrett and RA Barnes (eds), Law of the Sea: 
UNCLOS as a Living Treaty (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
London, 2016) 329–362, at p. 356.
43   F Francioni, ‘Peacetime use of force, military activities, and the new law of the sea’ (1985) 
18(2) Cornell International Law Journal 203–226, at p. 216.
44   Suriname, Law concerning the Extension of the Territorial Sea and the Establishment 
of a Contiguous Economic Zone (11 June 1978), at Art. 5, in Division for Ocean Affairs 
and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, The Law of the Sea: 
National Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone (United Nations, New York, 1993) 351. 
Honduras’s law contains a similar provision (Decree No. 921 on the Utilization of Marine 
Natural Resources (13 June 1980), at Art. 2, in ibid., at p. 129).
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Brazilian law, military exercises or manoeuvers, in particular those that imply 
the use of weapons or explosives, can only be carried out with the consent of 
the Brazilian Government.45 Brazil is perhaps the most adamant country which 
strictly regulates foreign military activities in its EEZ. As early as December 
1982 when Brazil signed the LOSC, it made a statement of this kind which was 
reiterated several times afterwards. The United States reacted to it on each oc-
casion by protesting against Brazil’s restrictions and stating its reservation of 
military exercises in Brazil’s EEZ as internationally lawful uses of the ocean.46
Relating to East Asia, it is worth mentioning Malaysia’s position. As stat-
ed, “the Malaysian Government also understands that the provisions of the 
Convention do not authorize other States to carry out military exercises or ma-
noeuvres, in particular those involving the use of weapons or explosives in the 
exclusive economic zone without the consent of the coastal State”.47 According 
to a prominent Malaysian scholar, three reasons explain Malaysia’s position. 
First, in Malaysia’s view, no law prohibits coastal state jurisdiction over for-
eign military activities in the EEZ. Moreover, unauthorised foreign military 
activities can undermine a coastal state’s security, particularly if they are non-
peaceful in nature. Second, the LOSC is a treaty where the provision on foreign 
military activities in the EEZ is a new and controversial concept, rather than 
customary international law. Third, the provision on military activities in the 
EEZ is not consistent with the principle of peaceful uses of the sea. Malaysia 
views foreign military activities in its EEZ as undermining and threatening its 
security as well.48
The regulations above are made under the rationale that military activities 
are inherently potential threats to peace and good order of the coastal states. 
Although such regulations are understandable, it should be borne in mind 
that not all military activities are threatening. Some military activities, such as 
the activities undertaken by the UN peacekeeping forces, are indispensable to 
maintaining peace and good order. In the same line of thought, some civilian 
activities may be threatening and this can be illustrated by a severe marine 
45   Brazil, Act concerning the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic 
Zone and the Continental Shelf (Act No. 8617 of 4 January 1993), at Art. 9, in ibid., at p. 38.
46   For details, see JA Roach and RW Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime 
Claims (2nd ed, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1996) 409–413. See also by the same authors, Excessive 
Maritime Claims (3rd ed, Nijhoff, Leiden, 2012) 379–392.
47   Malaysian Declaration Upon Ratification of the Convention (14 October 1996), available 
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm.
48   See BA Hamzah, ‘Military activities in the EEZ: Preliminary views from Malaysia’ in 
S Wu and K Zou (eds), Securing the Safety of Navigation in East Asia: Legal and Political 
Dimensions (Chandos, Oxford, 2013) 161–169. 
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pollution accident caused by a civilian activity or illegal fishing in the EEZ. 
In such a context, what we should look into is not the form of a certain activ-
ity, but its nature. If a military activity is threatening in nature and with clear 
bad intentions and/or in a hostile manner, it should be banned in the EEZ. 
Otherwise, it can be allowed under certain conditions in accordance with rel-
evant international law together with the regulations laid down by the coastal 
state, similar to the marine scientific research regime under the LOSC.
There is a discrepancy regarding the concept of the EEZ between the legal 
term and the operational term. The United States Navy divides the ocean into 
two categories: national waters and international waters, for operational and 
mobility purposes.49 The EEZ is accordingly categorized as ‘international 
waters’.50 However, it must be pointed out that it is only an expression for op-
erational purposes, thus in no way affecting the legal nature of the EEZ as a 
maritime zone within national jurisdiction under the LOSC.
It is worth mentioning that the East-West Center once organized several 
workshops on ‘military and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZ’. The 
launch of this series of workshops was triggered by the EP-3 incident between 
China and the United States. The first one was held in Bali, Indonesia in June 
2002, which focused on identifying disagreements and contrasting positions, 
as well as on areas of possible mutual understanding and agreement.51 The 
Honolulu Meeting in December 2003 went further and Guidelines for military 
and intelligence gathering activities in the EEZs were drafted, based on the 
49   National waters include internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters, and 
international waters include contiguous zones, EEZs, high seas and security zones. See 
United States, Department of the Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval 
Operations (July 2007) 1–7 to 1–9, available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/
NWP_1-14M_Commanders_Handbook.pdf.
50   The term “international waters” is even questioned by retired naval officials. See R Pedrozo, 
‘Preserving navigational rights and freedoms: The right to conduct military activities in 
China’s exclusive economic zone’ (2010) 9(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 9–29, at 
p. 19: “continued reliance on the term “international waters” by the United States muddies 
the waters and unnecessarily allows China to divert attention from the legitimacy of the 
US position by arguing that the United States does not know the difference between the 
EEZ and the high seas. The United States should therefore cease to use the term “interna-
tional waters” when referring to its lawful military activities in the EEZ”.
51   For details, see East-West Center, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in Exclusive 
Economic Zones: Consensus and Disagreement: A Summary of the Bali Dialogue (East-West 
Center, Honolulu, 2002).
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disagreement between maritime powers and developing coastal countries.52 
According to the Guidelines drafted by the study group,
ships and aircraft of a State undertaking military activities in the EEZ of 
another State have the obligation to use the ocean for peaceful purposes 
only, and to refrain from the threat or use of force, or provocative acts, 
such as stimulating or exciting the defensive systems of the coastal State; 
collecting information to support the use of force against the coastal 
State; or establishing a ‘sea base’ within another State’s EEZ without its 
consent. The user State should have due regard for the rights of others 
to use the sea including the coastal State and comply with its obligations 
under international law.53
Furthermore,
warships or aircraft of a State intending to carry out a major military ex-
ercise in the EEZ of another State should inform the coastal State and 
others through a timely navigational warning of the time, date and areas 
involved in the exercise, and if possible, invite observers from the coastal 
State to witness the exercise.54
As for military surveying, the Guidelines provide that “maritime surveillance 
may be conducted by States for peaceful purposes in areas claimed by other 
States as EEZ and should not prejudice the jurisdictional rights and respon-
sibilities of the coastal State within its EEZ”.55 Unfortunately, these construc-
tive Guidelines are rejected by the United States despite the involvement of 
American scholars in the drafting process.
It is worth mentioning that at the 14th Annual Conference of the Western 
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) held in Qingdao, China on 22 and 23 April 
2014, the participating navies agreed on the Code of Unplanned Encounters 
52   See H Djalal, A Yankov and A Bergin, ‘Draft guidelines for military and intelligence gather-
ing activities in the EEZ and their means and manner of implementation and enforce-
ment’ (2005) 29(2) Marine Policy 175–183.
53   See EEZ Group 21, ‘Guidelines for navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic 
zone’ (16 September 2005) Ocean Policy Research Foundation, available at https://www 
.spf.org/opri/publication/pdf/200509_20051205_e.pdf.
54   Ibid.
55   Ibid.
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at Sea (CUES).56 Though legally non-binding, it is helpful to avoid misunder-
standing and miscalculations at sea.57 It is reported that recently the US lit-
toral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) and the People’s Liberation Army 
Navy [PLA(N)] Jiangkai II frigate Hengshui (FFG 572) practiced the CUES on 
23 February 2015. The two warships conducted routine training and operations 
in international waters of the South China Sea, thereby enhancing the profes-
sional maritime relationship between the US 7th Fleet and the PLA(N).58 It 
seems that the two navies have attempted to narrow their differences on the 
issue of military activities in the EEZ.
In conclusion, military activities, except the exercise of the right of naviga-
tion in and/or overflight above the EEZ, under the LOSC are not navigational 
rights per se, but special rights associated with navigation. It should not be 
taken for granted that, in so far as such activities are navigation-associated, 
they will be treated equally as navigational rights.
 Related Issues
Several issues are relevant to navigation in the South China Sea. The first is 
China’s unilaterally drawn U-shaped line in the South China Sea. The U-shaped 
line in the South China Sea is the line with nine segments off the Chinese coast 
on the South China Sea, as displayed on the Chinese map. In February 1948, 
the Atlas of Administrative Areas of the Republic of China was officially pub-
lished, in which the above map was included.59 As mentioned by Franckx, the 
U-shaped line can have serious implications for navigational freedoms in the 
maritime areas enclosed within.60 It is evident that Chinese maritime law en-
forcement extends to the whole range of the U-shaped line. In February 2007, 
the State Council approved the scheme of regular rights-safeguarding law en-
forcement patrols carried out by China Ocean Surveillance in the Yellow Sea 
56   See P Xiaoqian, ‘Maritime security cooperation’ (8 May 2014) Beijing Review, available at 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/quotes/txt/2014-07/05/content_627875.htm.
57   See Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs, ‘Navy leaders agree to CUES at 14th WPNS’ 
(23 April 2014) United States Navy, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display 
.asp?story_id=80532.
58   See L Dempsey, ‘USS Fort Worth conducts CUES with Chinese Navy’ (26 February 2015) 
United States Navy, available at http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=85767.
59   Z Han (ed), A Compilation of Historical Materials on China’s South China Sea Islands 
(Oriental Press, Beijing, 1988) (in Chinese) 181–184.
60   E Franckx, ‘American and Chinese views on navigational rights of warships’ (2011) 10(1) 
Chinese Journal of International Law 187–206, at pp. 196–197.
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and the South China Sea. In 2008, China Maritime Surveillance began its regu-
lar law enforcement patrols, covering all sea areas within China’s jurisdiction 
from the Mouth of Yalu River to James Shoal (italics added).61
Whereas free navigation in the South China Sea is not hampered by the 
Chinese maritime law enforcement forces, some activities associated with 
marine resources exploration or with consolidation of territorial and/or mari-
time claims are disrupted. This is demonstrated by the Binh Minh 02 incident, 
when the Chinese cut the cables of a Vietnamese seismic surveying vessel,62 
and also by the Reed Bank incident, when the survey vessel MV Veritas Voyager 
chartered by Forum Energy, a UK-based oil and gas company, which had been 
awarded a contract by the Philippines, was disrupted by two Chinese patrol 
boats in March 2011.63
Related to the U-shaped line is the issue regarding China’s jurisdictional wa-
ters in addition to its internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf. 
It is recalled that in China’s Law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf, China 
states that the Law should not affect the historic rights of the PRC. This implies 
that China considers that there are some waters or some rights in some waters 
historically belonging to China. This is also connected with the Chinese legis-
lation on marine environmental protection and fishery management, which 
is not only applicable to the sea areas recognized under the LOSC, such as in-
ternal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone (CZ), the EEZ, and the 
continental shelf, but also “other sea areas” under China’s jurisdiction.64 The 
term “other sea areas” is believed to refer to waters within the U-shaped line, 
but it is not clear how China treats such “other sea areas”, as territorial sea, EEZ 
or otherwise? No clear explanation is ever given by the Chinese.
61   See China Maritime Law Enforcement Bulletin (2008), available at http://www.soa.gov.cn/
zwgk/hygb/zghyxzzfgb/2008nzghyxzzfgb/201212/t20121217_22961.html.
62   See ‘Vietnam says Chinese boat harassed survey ship; China disputes’ (9 June 2011) 
Bloomberg Businessweek, available at https://www.bloomberg.com/businessweek.
63   See I Storey, ‘China and the Philippines: Implications of the Reed Bank incident’ (6 May 
2011) China Brief (The Jamestown Foundation), available at http://www.jamestown.org/
single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37902.
64   According to the amended Law on Marine Environmental Protection and Law on Fisheries, 
they should apply to China’s internal waters, TS, contiguous zone, EEZ, CS, and other sea 
areas under China’s jurisdiction. China, Law on Marine Environmental Protection (ad-
opted on 23 August 1982, amended on 25 December 1999), at Art. 2, in People’s Daily (in 
Chinese) (28 December 1999); China, Fisheries Law (adopted 20 January 1986, amended 
on 31 October 2000), at Art. 2, in Gazette of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China (in Chinese) (No 6, 2000) 608–615.
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The second issue relates to China’s military zones established in the early 
1950s. China designated three military zones: The Military Alert Zone in the 
Bohai and Yellow Sea (37020’N. 123003’E to 39045’N, 124009’12”E); the Military 
Prohibited Navigation Zone around the mouth of the Qiangtang River of 
Zhejiang Province and close to the Taiwan Strait (27000’N, 121010’E to 30044’N, 
123025’E); and the Military Operational Zone south of 270N latitude which 
encompassed Taiwan and its environs.65 The lines to demarcate these zones 
were first publicly shown on the map attached to the Sino-Japanese (Non-
Governmental) Fishery Agreement signed in April 1955. China advised 
Japanese fishing vessels not to enter these zones; otherwise they had to bear 
any consequence by themselves. The 1985 revised map attached to the formal 
Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement still indicated the existence of such zones.66 
However, in the latest Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement signed in November 
1997, there was no such indication of the above designated zones. Thus, it is un-
clear whether these zones are still there and would hamper the navigation of 
foreign vessels. People may also be puzzled regarding the relationship between 
these zones and China’s territorial sea and/or EEZ in these seas.
Third, China has no archipelagic waters as defined under the LOSC, so strict-
ly speaking the navigational regime designed for archipelagic waters by the 
LOSC is not applicable in China. However, China encircled the Xisha (Paracel) 
Islands in 1996 with straight baselines. This has brought protests from other 
countries, particularly the United States. According to the United States, China 
would not be allowed to establish archipelagic straight baselines around the 
Paracel Islands because China is not an archipelagic state and the Paracel 
Islands are not an archipelago under the definition of the LOSC.67 The question 
of whether a continental state has the right to draw straight baselines around 
its mid-ocean islands or archipelagos is still debatable. In practice, some coun-
tries are using archipelagic straight baselines for their mid-ocean archipelagos, 
65   See J Greenfield, China’s Practice in the Law of the Sea (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992) 97.
66   See the third attached map in China, Bureau of Fishery Management, Ministry of 
Agriculture, The Sino-Japanese Governmental Fishery Agreements and Non-Governmental 
Protocols on Safety of Fishing Operations (in Chinese) (1993).
67   See United States Department of State, Office of Ocean Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, ‘Straight baselines claim: China’ 
(1996) 117 Limits in the Seas 1–16, at p. 8. LOSC (n 1) defines “archipelagic State” as “a State 
constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands”, and “an 
archipelago” as “a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and 
other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other 
natural features form an intrinsic geographic, economic and political entity, or which his-
torically have been regarded as such”. LOSC (n 1), at Art. 46.
262 zou
The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 32 (2017) 243–267
such as Ecuador (which encircled its Galapagos Islands in 1971), Denmark 
(around the Faroe Islands in 1976), and Portugal (around the Azores Islands in 
1985).68 Despite the controversy over China’s straight baselines for the Paracel 
Islands, foreign vessels can enjoy innocent passage under the LOSC within the 
waters encircled by China and treated as China’s internal waters.69 It is noted 
that the United States challenged China’s Paracel straight baselines as ‘exces-
sive maritime claims’ and the most recent challenge took place in October 
2016 when the US sent its destroyer USS Decatur there under the ‘Freedom of 
Navigation’ Program.
Finally, we need to look at the South China Sea Arbitration to see whether it 
has an impact on navigation in the South China Sea. On 22 January 2013, the 
Philippines, by a note verbale with the Notification and Statement of Claim 
on West Philippine Sea (i.e., South China Sea), instituted the compulsory ar-
bitration procedures stipulated in the LOSC against China, asking the Arbitral 
Tribunal to:
Declar[e] that China’s rights in regard to maritime areas in the South 
China Sea, like the rights of the Philippines, are those that are established 
by [the LOSC], and consist of its rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone under Part II of the Convention, to an Exclusive Economic Zone 
under Part V, and to a Continental Shelf under Part VI; Declar[e] that 
China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea based on its so-called 
“nine dash line” are contrary to [the LOSC] and invalid.70
A finding was sought that China is not entitled to exercise ‘historic rights’ over 
the waters, seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of its entitlements under the 
Convention in the areas encompassed within its so-called “nine-dash line”.
The case mainly concerned maritime entitlements as claimed by the 
Philippines, but some parts of the arbitral proceedings have implications 
68   See Roach and Smith (1994) (n 46), at pp. 112–122, and by the same authors (2012) (n 46), 
at pp. 108–115, where some other examples are added.
69   LOSC (n 1), at Art. 8(2) provides that: “Where the establishment of a straight baseline in 
accordance with the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal 
waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of innocent pas-
sage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those waters”.
70   The diplomatic note and the Philippines’ ‘Notification and Statement of Claim’ are avail-
able in South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People’s Republic of 
China), Memorial of the Philippines, Volume III, at Annexes 1 and 2 (30 March 2014), PCA 
Case No. 2013–19, available at http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7.
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for navigation in the South China Sea. Particularly, in the Memorial of the 
Philippines submitted to the Arbitral Tribunal in March 2014, the Philippines 
accused, in its Submission 13, Chinese vessels of threatening Philippine ves-
sels in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal by engaging in highly dangerous ma-
noeuvres that had caused serious risks of collision and that China thus violated 
Article 94 of LOSC and the COLREGS (1972 Convention on the International 
Regulation for Preventing Collisions at Sea).71 In the Award of 12 July 2016, the 
Arbitral Tribunal fully supported the Philippines’ allegation and found that 
“China has, by virtue of the conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels in 
the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, created serious risk of collision and danger 
to Philippine vessels and personnel. The Tribunal finds China to have violat-
ed Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the COLREGS and, as a consequence, to be in 
breach of Article 94 of the Convention”.72
There are a couple of problems regarding the findings of the Arbitral 
Tribunal. For example, the Tribunal treated the adjacent waters of the 
Scarborough Reef as high seas and consequently applied the COLREGS. As 
pointed out, it is absurd that the Tribunal allows foreign vessels to sail into the 
TS of a coastal state but that said state should not undertake any law enforce-
ment activity but instead should keep its distance from these vessels by com-
plying with the COLREGS.73
In addition, other parts of the Final Award in the South China Sea Arbitration 
also have legal implications for navigation in the South China Sea. For exam-
ple, the arbitral findings that Mischief Reef, currently occupied by China, is a 
low-tide elevation in the EEZ of the Philippines and that Chinese land recla-
mation activities there are treated as artificial installations give a wider special 
area for free navigation in the surroundings of that Reef. The arbitral Award is, 
in particular, favourable for the United States to further assert its freedom of 
navigation in the South China Sea.
71   Ibid., Memorial of the Philippines, Volume I (30 March 2014), at Chapter 6.IV.
72   Ibid., Award (12 July 2016), at para. 1109.
73   See D Zhang and R Zhang, ‘The legitimacy of Chinese vessels’ law enforcement activities 
in the territorial sea of Huangyan Dao—Comments on the fallacy of submission 13 and 
the award thereon in the South China Sea Arbitration Case’ (2016) 7 Asia Pacific Security 
and Maritime Affairs (in Chinese), at p. 66.
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 Conclusions
One should be aware that the United States is most adamant in defending the 
freedom of navigation due to its importance for military mobility. In 1979, the 
United States set up the Freedom of Navigation Program which was designed to 
challenge what are in the US’s view so-called ‘excessive maritime claims’.74 As 
intended, the United States likes to target those states with military capability.75 
China could be one of such states. As some of China’s domestic rules relating 
to navigation and other ocean uses are regarded by the United States as exces-
sive, those rules are vulnerable to challenges by the US through the Freedom 
of Navigation Program. In recent years, China and the United States reached 
agreements in terms of navigational rights in the South China Sea. These in-
clude the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for 
the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters76 and the 2015 Supplement to the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of 
Air and Maritime Encounters.77 They make many references to COLREGS and 
CUES. However, despite these agreements, incidents have occurred between 
the two sides in the South China Sea from time to time. The seizure of an 
American underwater drone deployed by a US military oceanographic vessel 
in the South China Sea on 16 December 2016 was the latest incident.
As is rightly pointed out, the freedoms of the high seas are not absolute 
rights, but conditional: “[T]hese are not absolute rights but are subject to a 
number of limitations and corresponding duties upon which their legal 
74   The objective of this Program “combines diplomatic action and operational assertions of 
navigation and overflight rights to encourage modification of and to demonstrate nonac-
quiescence in maritime claims that are inconsistent with the navigation and overflight 
freedoms reflected in the 1982 LOS Convention”. United States Department of Defence, 
‘U.S. program for the exercise of navigation and overflight rights at sea’ (1983) cited in 
RJ Grunawalt, ‘Freedom of navigation in the post-Cold War era’ in Rothwell and Bateman 
(n 37) 11–21, at p. 18.
75   Ibid.
76   US-China Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and 
Maritime Encounters (Washington and Beijing, 9–10 November 2014), available at http://
archive.defense.gov/pubs/141112_MemorandumOfUnderstandingRegardingRules.pdf.
77   Supplement to the US-China Memorandum of Understanding on the Rules of Behavior 
for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters (Beijing and Washington, 15–18 September 
2015), available at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/US-CHINA_AIR_
ENCOUNTERS_ANNEX_SEP_2015.pdf.
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exercise is pre-conditioned”.78 Freedom of navigation is also conditional. The 
United States, when exercising this freedom, has to pay due regard to the 
public order of the South China Sea and to the rights and interests of the lit-
toral states. Navigation in the South China Sea never becomes an issue but 
the United States uses the freedom of navigation as a pretext to enhance its 
military presence in the South China Sea with the aim to deter and confront 
a rising China. It is perceived that with the Trump Administration in power, 
the rivalry between China and the United States in the South China Sea will 
be more intensive, which is detrimental to peace, stability and prosperity in 
the region.
There should be caution for foreign vessels navigating in and through dis-
puted waters due to the unclear maritime boundary delimitation between 
China and its neighbouring countries. In terms of maritime boundary de-
limitation, China has only settled the delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin with 
Vietnam. China has to negotiate and settle maritime boundary issues with 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, respectively, in the 
South China Sea. Some boundary issues are even entangled with overlapping 
territorial claims made by China and other countries to tiny islands situated 
in the South China Sea. Yet, the undemarcated sea areas may not greatly affect 
the navigational rights of foreign vessels. For example, China pledged to en-
sure the unimpeded passage of foreign vessels in the South China Sea, despite 
China’s territorial claims to the islands there as well as to the maritime rights 
and interests.79 Even after the South China Sea Arbitration, China still main-
tains its original position that “China is committed to upholding the freedom 
of navigation and overflight enjoyed by all states under international law, and 
78   See D Freestone, ‘International governance, responsibility and management of areas 
beyond national jurisdiction’ (2012) 27(2) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
191–204, at p. 200.
79   As the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs states: “China attaches great importance to 
the safety and unimpededness of the international water lanes in the South China Sea. 
Its efforts to safeguard its sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and maritime rights and 
interests do not affect the freedom of the passage foreign vessels and aircraft enjoy in 
accordance with international law. In fact, China has never interfered with the freedom 
of passage of foreign vessels and aircraft in this area, nor will it ever do so in the future. 
China is ready to work together with the littoral states of the South China Sea to safeguard 
the safety the international water lanes in the area of the South China Sea”. See Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Basic stance and policy of the Chinese Government in solv-
ing the South China Sea issue’ (17 November 2000), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/topics_665678/3754_666060/t19230.shtml.
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ensuring the safety of sea lanes of communication”.80 On the other hand, if 
there is tension, even armed conflict, between claimant states in the disputed 
areas or between China and the United States, then normal navigation would 
be unnecessarily but inevitably hampered.
Finally, it is to be noted that at present, China and ASEAN countries are dis-
cussing and negotiating a legally binding Code of Conduct for the South China 
Sea (COC). Safety of navigation and navigational security should be consid-
ered and incorporated into the future agreement. It is recalled that in the 2002 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), China and 
its ASEAN counterparts reaffirmed “their respect for and commitment to the 
freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided 
for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.81 This respect and commitment 
should be necessarily reiterated in the upcoming COC. It is a positive sign that 
in September 2016, ASEAN members and China adopted the Joint Statement 
on the Application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in 
the South China Sea, and the Guidelines for Hotline Communications among 
Senior Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of ASEAN Member States 
and China in Response to Maritime Emergencies in the Implementation of the 
DOC. The two sides planned to finish the consultation on the COC outline in 
the first half of 2017 under circumstances without disturbances.82 It is there-
fore strongly believed that navigation in the South China Sea will be adequate-
ly addressed in the negotiations on the COC and the COC itself.
80   See China, State Council Information Office, ‘China adheres to the position of settling 
through negotiation the relevant disputes between China and the Philippines in the 
South China Sea’ (13 July 2016), available at http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/ 
2016/07/13/content_281475392503075.htm.
81   Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Phnom Penh, 4 November 
2002), available at http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties 
-in-the-south-china-sea.
82   Chairman’s Statement of the 19th ASEAN-China Summit to Commemorate the 25th 
Anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations (Vientiane, 7 September 2016), available 
at http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Final-Chairmans-Statement-of-the-ASEAN-China 
-25th-Anniversary-Commemo….pdf.
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Table 1 National Regulations concerning navigation by the states adjacent to the South 
China Sea
Brunei: 12 nm TS
China: Requires prior notice for transport of waste in TS and EEZ
 Requires warships to get prior authorisation for passage through TS
 CZ 24 nm security interests
Indonesia: peaceful crossing rights through the territorial sea and waters of 
the Indonesian
 archipelago;
 archipelagic sea channel crossing;
 free transit crossing rights;
 freedom of navigation in EEZ
Malaysia: prior consent to military activities in EEZ and CS
Philippines: freedoms with respect to navigation and overflight in EEZ
  expressed concern at UNCLOS III in respect of military 
activities in  EEZ
Vietnam:  Warships require authorisation to be applied for at least 30 days 
prior to passage through TS; passage restricted to three warships at 
a time
 CZ 24 nm security interests
Source: prepared by the author with references to UN Secretariat, Office of Legal Affairs, Division 
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, ‘Maritime space: Maritime zones and maritime delimi-
tation’, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/asia.htm; and 
S Kaye, ‘State practice and maritime claims: Assessing the normative impact of the Law of the 
Sea Convention’ in A Chircop, TL McDorman and SJ Rolston (eds), The Future of Ocean Regime-
Building: Essays in Tribute to Douglas M. Johnston (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2009) 133–158, at 
pp. 151–154.
